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Abstract  
This study examines the use of interest rate swaps by Italian municipalities during the 
2000-2014 period. Through a constructive critique of Foucauldian political economy, 
it argues that local administrators did not enter the swaps market to perform and 
depoliticize the disciplinary power of financialized discourses. The evidence suggests 
many more layers of historical complexity underlie the municipalities' actions than a 
Foucauldian approach can grasp. Local governments used swaps to circumvent the 
budget constraints imposed by the European Stability and Growth Pact. In this sense, 
municipalities acted more for political-strategic than for performative and 
depoliticized purposes. Rethinking the dimensions of performativity and disciplinary 
power – through an approach that is more sensitive than Foucauldian analysis to 
historical agency and asymmetrical power relations – is crucial to address the 
differential and politically shaped contours of financialization across the globe. 
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Introduction  
The existing literature on financialization is an invaluable resource for exploring how 
modern finance pervades human relations with its market-based practices and 
technologies.1 In this regard, this literature could provide appropriate analytical tools 
for critically examining the striking growth of derivatives markets and their use in 
specific contexts, such as Italy.2 However, despite its insightful analyses and 
progressive ideas, this body of research has a weakness: it does not devote sufficient 
attention to examining how financialization spreads unevenly across the world 
depending on distinct power relations and processes of institution building. In brief, 
the debate fails to capture what several scholars describe as the varieties of 
financialization and the politics producing such heterogeneity (Engelen, et al., 2010; 
Engelen & Konings, 2010: 608–9; Montgomerie, 2008: 241; Nölke, et al., 2013).  
The difficulty of accounting for the differential and politically shaped 
trajectories of financialization is particularly evident in the work of Foucault-inspired 
political economists. Authors such as Aitken (2007), De Goede (2005) and Langley 
(2009) conceptualize present-day financial expansion as a system of beliefs that 
individuals perform – that is, create and reproduce – in their daily habits. Such a 
conceptualization implies that the more individuals repeat financial practices, the 
more such routines consolidate into a depoliticized – meaning removed from political 
influence – mode of governance, the power of which disciplines society as a whole. 
Clearly, Foucauldians acknowledge the role of human agency in constructing 
financialized phenomena. In this regard, they could provide the tools to describe the 
actors who shape financialization in its context-specific features and explain how and 
why they do so. Yet, by extensively relying on the two intertwined notions of 
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performativity and disciplinary power, the Foucauldian framework renders 
financialization a politically inactive entity that replicates similar institutions 
everywhere. Indeed, when everyone is regarded as performing and depoliticizing 
omnipresent financialized discourses, it is difficult to appreciate how individuals 
relate to such discursive structures through different perceptions, objectives and 
capabilities – ultimately rendering financialization a globally heterogeneous and 
highly politicized formation. 
This article constructively engages with Foucauldian studies on finance. It 
does so through an agency-centred perspective that returns the dimension of power to 
the level of historical actors, their conflicts and the institutions mediating agential 
interaction (Knafo, 2010; Konings, 2010). In so doing, the study advances a 
conceptual framework that is more sensitive than the Foucauldian one to the actual 
politics that shape financialization in distinct institutional environments. Drawing on 
this approach, the article investigates the case of Italian municipalities and their 
controversial use of interest rate swaps during the 2000-2014 period. It argues that 
local administrators began employing swaps to circumvent the budget constraints 
imposed by the European Stability and Growth Pact. In other words, far from 
performing and depoliticizing the use of derivatives – the logical conclusion that 
Foucauldian scholars would draw – Italian municipalities entered the swaps market en 
masse as a political-strategic move against an unsustainable regime of fiscal austerity. 
In so doing, local authorities contributed to the unfolding of derivatives-based 
practices as a variegated and politically meaningful phenomenon. 
The argument in the article is developed in four steps. First, it rethinks the 
Foucauldian conceptual apparatus from the perspective of the agency-centred method. 
Second, the work explores the specificities of the Italian case, focusing on the 
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historical dynamics – the key agents, power struggles and processes of institutional 
construction – that led to the emergence of derivatives in local finance from the late 
1990s onwards. Third, the study explains the derivatives-based tactics that 
municipalities employed during the 2000-2008 period. This section shows, in 
practical terms, the political-strategic – rather than performative and depoliticized – 
character of local authorities’ accounting devices. Finally, the last section concludes 
by reviewing the post-2008 regulatory developments in Italy and the derivatives 
excesses of other local authorities worldwide.  
Rethinking performativity and disciplinary power in the age 
of financialization 
Foucauldian political economists explore financialization as a web of interrelated 
discourses that individuals perform in their daily routines. In so doing, modern 
financial practices permeate social relations with their disciplinary power, and they 
tend to become a depoliticized sphere of human activity. However, although this 
financial discipline is pervasive, individuals do not completely internalize it. This 
partial internalization leaves space for the existence of dissent and the re-politicization 
of financial affairs (Aitken, 2007; De Goede, 2005; Langley, 2009).  
          To cite an example of how this framework can be operationalized, 
municipalities support the discourse according to which using interest rate swaps is a 
rational way to hedge the risk of interest-rate volatility. Thus, as they use these 
speculative instruments to manage fluctuations in the underlying financial variables, 
they also allow the complexities of derivative markets – such as various swap curves, 
the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA) Master Agreement and so forth – to gradually pervade everyday 
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life. In this sense, they perform the discourse of derivatives-based risk management 
and enable its reproduction and diffusion deep within the social fabric. At this point, 
the disciplinary power of such discourse has become so pervasive that the use of 
derivatives turns into a depoliticized and technical matter that is largely removed from 
democratic influence. Clearly, regulators might intervene to shape derivatives markets 
differently, as indicated by the current reforms of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives 
markets (FSB, 2010).3 However, policy makers, market participants and the general 
public do not ultimately entertain any doubt about the use of derivatives as a valid 
means of managing financial risks compared with other – and possibly less 
speculative – forms of risk governance.  
At first glance, a Foucauldian approach appears to provide a convincing 
conceptualization of agency that could help account for who constructs the 
differential and politically shaped trajectories of financialization and how and why 
they engage in such processes. However, the two concepts of performativity and 
disciplinary power produce an inactive perspective of agency that prevents scholars 
from appreciating financialization as a political and heterogeneous construction.  
As Konings (2009b: 73–9) explains, viewing actors as performing finance 
through discursive iterations confers excessive coherence to the norms that 
individuals experience in numerous specific ways. For instance, ordinary people may 
have different concerns and strategic capabilities compared with, for example, Henry 
Paulson or Richard Fuld – two prominent figures in the United States subprime 
crisis.4 However, performativity tends to obscure these differences by implying that 
all agents are equal performers of financialization. Whether an individual is an 
influential chief executive officer of a financial corporation or a humble university 
professor does not matter. Diversity is generally irrelevant because all actors 
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ultimately perform and depoliticize the disciplinary power of financialization that 
permeates society as a whole. Thus, although historical agents are acknowledged, they 
are nevertheless emptied of their resources – because the power dimension lies 
beyond the reach of individual forces and instead resides in the ethereal space of 
financialization as a performative-discursive regime (De Goede, 2005: 8-13; 2006: 9-
11; Langley, 2007: 27-31). 
Therefore, in an exploration of the differential and politically significant 
features of financialized dynamics, two aspects of social construction are concealed. 
First, certain actors clearly advance the discourses of financialization to strengthen 
their actions against others. By emphasizing the diffuse character of disciplinary 
power while neglecting asymmetrical relations amongst agents, Foucauldian political 
economists fail to capture the actual actors who adapt financialization differently and 
to explain how they do so through political struggles unfolding in specific 
circumstances. Second, agents do not simply perform and depoliticize the dominant 
discourses of financialization; rather, they construct – or relate to – them in a strategic 
sense. Agents do so to gain margins of control over the surrounding reality that they 
experience (Konings, 2009b: 75), a context that is always permeated by political 
conflicts and that is never truly depoliticized, even when it acquires a “logic of 
calculability and an appearance of scientific objectivity that places its fundamental 
assumptions […] beyond discussion and debate” (De Goede, 2005: 3).  
To clarify, the central problem of Foucauldian political economy is that its 
conceptual apparatus is geared towards exploring how discourses constitute agential 
subjectivities – and in turn the entire society – through habitual behaviours. 
Undoubtedly, Foucauldians are able to capture this aspect accurately. However, while 
doing so, they fail to account for how discursive structures also enable the 
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development of agential tactics. Actors are depicted as generally idle and driven by 
discourses the construction of which they hardly influence. In other words, “what 
remains insufficiently developed is a conception of structuration as enabling, i.e. a 
conception of symbolic and institutional formations, not only as constituting actors, 
but also as facilitating their ability to act in the world” (Konings, 2010: 63 emphasis 
in original). Beyond the routine-based character of human agency and its habitual role 
in social construction, it is also crucial to explore the capacity of agents to imagine 
future alternative worlds and to contextualize their forward-thinking actions within 
the pragmatic contingencies of the present (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). 
This critique highlights the necessity of developing a more historically 
sensitive method than the Foucauldian approach to interpret the politics of 
financialization and its multi-faceted contours across space. In this regard, this study 
builds on the central notion that power should not be conceptualized as an ubiquitous 
apparatus of disciplinary control (Foucault, 1977: 176-7). It is instead fundamental to 
place power at the level of historical agency, once institutions or discourses are 
viewed as the mediating ground of agential relations (Knafo, 2010: 504). In other 
words, the relationship between agency and institutions should be understood to 
articulate in a ‘triadic’ manner in that it entails not an agent-structure dualism, but an 
agent-agent interaction that is mediated by complex institutional architectures 
(Konings, 2010: 68). The subtle difference is that this triadic perspective on human 
interaction describes a scenario in which agents do not face objectified power 
structures, but rather interact with other agents by continuously manipulating – or, 
more simply, relating to – mediating institutions. 
A triadic context has profound implications for the way in which we 
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conceptualize power. Here, power becomes the agential ability to manipulate 
institutions to gain leverage in a particular scenario. It is interpreted at the level of 
praxis where certain agents are willing and intellectually able to experiment with 
existing institutions, to risk failure and become lost in creative confusion and, finally, 
to advance innovative ideas that could become widely acknowledged norms. Other 
agents, on the contrary, gradually abandon their attempt to empower themselves, 
deactivating their creativity and agreeing to experience reality according to extant 
rules. In this sense, new institutions provide leverage to those who advanced them 
through experimenting and reshaping while simultaneously eliminating opportunities 
for others (Konings, 2010: 70). However, far from becoming a structural reification of 
human relations, the newly created institutional environment always presents 
opportunities for further manipulation (Lagna, 2015: 211–2). This triadic 
conceptualization of institutional construction reveals a paradox that becomes prolific 
for empowering purposes. When agents create new institutions, these institutions do 
not simply constrain other actors, but enable them to experience imperatives in 
multiple ways (Knafo, 2010; Konings, 2010). As the following sections demonstrate, 
this aspect is fundamental to comprehend how Italian neoliberal forces exerted power 
by constructing market-oriented institutions. Yet, municipalities accepted such 
constraints on their own strategic terms, eventually transforming the restrictive rules 
to which they were initially subjected. 
In brief, the agency-centred approach does not regard social construction as a 
process in which individuals perform and depoliticize present-day financial 
expansion. Rather, it places power at the level of agency and offers actors the ability 
to interpret and transform institutions on the ground. This historically sensitive 
framework thus allows us to properly recognize financialization as a highly 
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politicized and variegated process of institutional formation in the making.  
The next section begins to explore the specificities of the Italian case. It 
examines the historical circumstances – the key actors, power struggles and processes 
of institution building – that prompted the introduction of derivatives in Italian local 
finance. 
 
Dismantling finanza derivata and introducing financial 
derivatives 
Italian local authorities began to approach OTC derivatives markets in the mid-
1990s.5 Two interconnected processes were decisive in this regard. First, Italy 
complied with the Stability and Growth Pact in line with the objective of joining the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999. Second, the country underwent a 
process of fiscal and administrative decentralization from the central state to local 
governments. Both aspects are examined in turn. 
During the 1990s, Italy faced the imperative of reducing public deficits and 
debt owing to its commitment to satisfy the Maastricht convergence criteria prior to 
EMU admission in 1999. A domestic alliance comprising neoliberal-minded 
technocrats and centre-left politicians (henceforth, neoliberal reformists) came to 
power and strongly supported the country's participation in this project.6 For them, 
European integration represented an important opportunity because it functioned as an 
‘external constraint’ (Dyson & Featherstone, 1996; Sbragia, 2001) on the traditional 
political and business establishment, which heavily depended on the dissipation of 
public finance (Pasquino, 2000: 79), control over state-owned enterprises (Bianchi, 
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1987) and, finally, a corporate governance regime that worked to the advantage of 
majority shareholders (Deeg, 2005). This key objective of neoliberal reformists to 
keep the old establishment at bay explains Italy's eagerness to join the EMU against 
all odds. In practice, however, other more feasible options were available (Quaglia, 
2004: 1101–3).  
Thus, as neoliberal actors enhanced their power position by modernizing Italy 
in line with the market-oriented dynamics of the EMU, they strove to ensure that the 
country complied with the Stability and Growth Pact in 1997. The latter made 
European states adhere to low budget deficits through a system of sanctions (Heipertz 
& Verdun, 2004; 2005), and inevitably, this austere architecture exerted pressures on 
European economies – both their central and local administrations – to reform their 
financing strategies. Indeed, the Italian budget law for the year 1999 included a 
comprehensive plan for the coordination of public finance known as Patto di Stabilità 
Interno (Internal Stability Pact), which is the domestic equivalent of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (Italian Parliament, 1999a). This plan established a maximum limit on 
the annual expenditures of regions, provinces and municipalities.  
In addition to advocating Italy’s strict compliance with the Stability and 
Growth Pact, neoliberal reformists embraced the benefits of fiscal and administrative 
devolution, a bipartisan theme that was also favoured by centre-right forces such as 
the Northern League (Alonso, 2012: 197–8). The project gained momentum in the 
first of four consecutive laws in 1997 (Italian Parliament, 1997a; 1997b; 1998; 
1999b), and it was eventually finalized with the consolidated law on local authorities 
in 2000 and the reform of the constitutional law in 2001 (Italian Government, 2000; 
Italian Parliament, 2001a). This last legislative step granted local authorities broader 
margins of autonomy in managing revenues, expenditures and debt. In other words, 
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these reforms began to dismantle the old system of local finance that policy makers 
had until then defined as finanza derivata (Italian Parliament, 2010b: 5).7 This term 
implied that the revenues of local authorities ‘derived from’ state transfers with the 
exception of the limited income that came from locally levied taxes. In simple terms, 
the state collected most of the inland revenues and then transferred funds to local 
administrations. When state transfers were insufficient, local authorities financed 
investments through fixed-rate loans from two public institutes, namely, Cassa 
Depositi e Prestiti and Consorzio di Credito per le Opere Pubbliche (Rosati, 2009: 4).  
Collectively, Italy's adherence to the Stability and Growth Pact and the 
dismantling of finanza derivata created a radically different scenario for 
municipalities. Indeed, while the level of state transfers began to decline in response 
to budgetary constraints, local administrations obtained greater autonomy in policies 
concerning revenues, expenditures and debt. In this context, they were allowed to 
approach financial markets, instruments and actors beyond the traditional state-
controlled sphere (Saccomanni, 2007: 17). They were thus able to familiarize 
themselves with the use of bonds and derivatives-based techniques, which appeared to 
be attractive solutions compared with other relatively expensive forms of financing, 
such as loans from Cassa Depositi e Prestiti. In essence, local authorities began to 
shift away from the regime of state-led finanza derivata towards a market-based one 
involving financial derivatives, amongst other tools.  
Regulation concerning the use of derivatives by local authorities mirrored the 
political-economic trends described above. The first blow to the old system of sub-
sovereign finance occurred in 1994 when Italy ended the monopoly of Cassa Depositi 
e Prestiti and Consorzio di Credito per le Opere Pubbliche in the allocation of loans 
to local governments. Municipalities were now allowed to enter into debt by issuing 
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bonds. Consequently, they were obliged to use currency swaps in the case of fixed-
income positions that were denominated in foreign currencies (Italian Parliament, 
1994; MEF, 1996). No other regulation on the use of other types of derivatives, such 
as interest rate swaps, was implemented. Thereafter, the government began to 
establish more specific directives concerning all kind of derivatives instruments 
available to local authorities during the 2001-2004 period (Italian Parliament, 2001b; 
2003; MEF, 2003; 2004). These directives were successively updated several times 
after 2004 (Italian Parliament, 2006; MEF, 2007a; 2007b), but their content remained 
substantially unchanged until 2008, when the government imposed a moratorium that 
prevented local authorities from entering into new derivatives contracts.8  
The key point regarding this regulatory framework is that, as the next section 
shows, it was inadequate and it enabled many municipalities to use derivatives in 
unorthodox ways. Furthermore, it was designed and implemented during the centre-
right administration led by Silvio Berlusconi, which came into power in 2001. As 
Berlusconi’s political-economic platform was rather hesitant towards respecting 
European dictates (Ginsborg, 2001: 297), the regulation concerning the use of 
derivatives by local authorities was clearly part and parcel of a broader policy regime 
that vaunted the use of financial chicanery as a method to circumvent the constraints 
of the Stability and Growth Pact.9 
 
Municipalities and the strategic adoption of interest rate 
swaps 
Thus far, this study has explored the agents, power relations and dynamics of 
institution building that led to the emergence of financial derivatives as debt-
management tools in Italian local finance. It has shown that neoliberal reformists 
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came to power in Italy during the 1990s and challenged the traditional political-cum-
business establishment by introducing fiscal austerity and market-oriented reforms in 
line with the EMU and the Stability and Growth Pact. In addition to this, neoliberal 
reformists supported the devolution of fiscal and administrative authority. On the one 
hand, Italy’s compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact caused a reduction of 
fund transfers from the central state to the sub-sovereign level. On the other hand, the 
process of decentralization granted local authorities greater autonomy in the 
administration of their finances and the possibility to use bonds and derivatives. These 
two trends shaped an institutional environment in which local governments embraced 
the practices and instruments of market-based finance. From 2001 onwards, the 
Berlusconi administration – praising the adoption of accounting deception against 
European directives (Flores D’Arcais, 2011; Ginsborg, 2003) – implemented flawed 
regulation to oversee the use of derivatives by local authorities. 
The following subsections depart from the general political-economic context 
and examine the distinct derivatives techniques that Italian municipalities adopted. 
First, a standard example of a municipal financing plan that involved interest rate 
swaps is presented. Second, a key accounting artifice highlighting how numerous 
municipalities embraced financial innovation for political-strategic purposes is 
discussed. In so doing, the following subsections demonstrate that the neoliberal 
reforms did not simply constrain municipalities but enabled them to engage in 
manipulation on their own terms.  
Interest rate swaps: an example 
Interest rate swaps are typically used to optimize the costs of municipal liabilities by 
restructuring the debt position. Such debt restructuring aims to save part of financial 
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resources that were previously used to service debt, therefore generating greater 
liquidity in a municipal budget.  
For instance, in the simple case of a municipality in the Apulia region, debt 
restructuring operations consisted in closing over sixty fixed-rate loans – totalling 
approximately €10 million – which were borrowed from the state-controlled bank 
Cassa Depositi e Prestiti during the period between 1997 and 2004.10 Over the same 
period, the municipality issued fixed-rate bonds (3.75 per cent) for the same value and 
with a 20-year maturity. A specialized private bank assisted in all phases of the 
issuance of these municipal bonds and underwrote the entire lot by holding it on its 
balance sheet. In other words, the municipality had the opportunity to eliminate its 
debt (loans) with Cassa Depositi e Prestiti and instead to issue bonds to exploit 
favourable market rates. 
Interest rate swaps were initially employed in 2006. Controversially, the same 
private bank involved in the municipal bonds proposed that the municipality enter 
into a fixed-to-floating swap. Recall that the swap does not substitute for the 
municipality’s previous commitments on the 20-year-maturity bond. The swap is a 
distinct contract that operates akin to a bet. In the fixed-to-floating case of the 
Southern Italian municipality, the bank was the fixed-rate payer, whereas the 
municipality was the floating-rate payer. In this type of swap, the nature of the bet is 
that the fixed-rate payer has a negative flow of funds towards the floating-rate payer 
when the interest rate declines and vice versa. In our case, owing to the interest-rate 
scenarios, the municipality initially had a positive flow of funds. In practical terms, 
the municipality still paid a fixed rate of 3.75 per cent on its bonds, but these interest 
payments were discounted by a certain number of basis points in line with the flow of 
funds that derived from the swap bet in variable terms. However, a problem emerged 
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once interest rates rose after the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers, turning the 
municipality’s initially positive flows negative. Thus, the opportunity was not as 
attractive as it had first appeared.  
In general terms, many other municipalities across the country experienced 
similarly negative circumstances, regardless of the specific variables and features of 
their derivatives contracts. According to data from the Bank of Italy (2009: 22; 2014: 
22), 310 municipalities had a negative exposure to derivatives, representing a market 
value of €343 million in December 2005. This figure increased to 619 municipalities 
with a negative market value of €686 million by December 2007. In December 2009 – 
that is, after the 2008 moratorium – the number of municipalities declined to 429 with 
a negative market value of €569 million. Finally, the latest data available from June 
2014 indicate that 114 municipalities have a negative exposure to derivatives, with a 
negative market value of €390 million. However, note that these quantitative data 
only account for municipalities. If we also include provinces and regions, the negative 
market value increases (in absolute terms) to over €1 billion in June 2014. 
Furthermore, these data only concern the activities of financial intermediaries that 
operate in Italy. However, larger local authorities typically contracted with foreign 
operators, which account for an approximately 60 per cent market share. In other 
words, the data represent an approximation that underestimates a much broader 
phenomenon (Franco, 2009: 26–7). According to the Financial Times, losses could 
reach €10 billion if not only swaps but also sinking funds are included (Sanderson, et 
al., 2010). 
A key accounting device: the upfront 
The events described above demonstrate how local administrators adopted interest 
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rate swaps to compensate for the budgetary restrictions resulting from the market-
oriented reforms of local finance. By more actively managing municipal debt, the 
local authority cited above attempted to exploit lower interest rates relative to the rate 
for its fixed-rate bonds. Such practices can appear as instances of depoliticized 
performativity in which municipalities subscribed to the disciplinary power of 
financialization. In other words, local authorities may have embraced the discourse of 
active debt management (Cassard & Folkerts-Landau, 1997) and entered derivatives 
markets as the latest financial innovation. However, local authorities do not appear to 
have embraced such a discourse, or at least, such motivations do not seem to be an 
important element of the story. Rather, the scenario is replete with politically 
significant implications on the part of municipalities and their resistance towards the 
austere system imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact. This aspect becomes clear 
once we thoroughly examine the strategic modalities through which most local 
governments employed swaps. To do so, we focus on the accounting elements of the 
phenomenon, particularly the so-called upfront. 
Under growing budget constraints, many municipalities attempted to make a 
virtue of the available practices by manipulating them. In this regard, the upfront was 
the key aspect that induced local authorities to become overexposed to swaps. 
Generally, the upfront is a sum that banks advanced to municipalities to place the 
contract in a market-neutral position, which occurred when the swap was of a non-par 
type. When the two parties entered into the contract, the swap hence presented a 
negative market value for one of the two parties (in this case, a given municipality). 
Thus, the bank brought the contract to par by advancing an upfront sum to the 
municipality that should be equivalent to the negative market value to which the local 
government was exposed at the signing of the contract (Rosati, 2009: 1–2). At this 
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point, “in the revolving-door world of Italian local politics, each new administration 
wanted its own upfront, so asked their bankers to restructure the deal to release more 
cash in advance” (Sanderson, et al., 2010). Obviously, banks welcomed such an 
opportunity for easy profit from sub-sovereign markets by using a declaration form in 
which the head of financial services in a given municipality agreed to be considered a 
‘qualified operator’ (operatore qualificato) – that is, an expert who is able to 
understand the mathematics of complex financial risks.11 In so doing, “the terms of 
the swap tended to become restrictive each time. Some banks covered the cost of the 
upfront fee by pricing the interest rate swap more aggressively, so that only in unusual 
circumstances would the entity receive more each period than it paid out” (Sanderson, 
et al., 2010). 
The ‘upfront’ was crucial because it affected municipal budget policies 
through an accounting artifice. Municipalities regarded the upfront as revenue rather 
than debt, circumventing the budget constraint of 15 per cent in the debt-to-revenue 
ratio as imposed by the pact of internal stability. In other words, municipalities 
artificially increased the revenue side of the ratio while leaving their debt position 
essentially unchanged. Paradoxically, the upfront became a virtue for the purposes of 
achieving political consensus at the local level (Carlini, 2010). Indeed, this financial 
expedient became important in a context in which the devolution of fiscal 
administration and the decentralization of political party structures were enhancing 
the power position of sub-national elites and their patron-client relations (Galli Della 
Loggia, 2013; Hopkin, 2008). 
Current scenarios and the experience of other countries  
By deploying the strategies described above, Italian local authorities transformed their 
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use of derivatives into a heated controversy. In the summer of 2008, the majority of 
swaps positions presented substantial losses for municipalities. This situation forced 
the government to enact the above-mentioned moratorium that prevented local 
administrations from entering into derivatives contracts until a new regulation was 
agreed upon (Italian Government, 2008; Italian Parliament, 2008a; 2008b). For five 
years, policy makers developed on a framework to regulate the use of derivatives in 
local finance and examined aspects such as the types of instruments that should have 
been available to local authorities, the derivatives components that municipalities 
could have included in their financing strategies and, finally, the transparency of 
information that should be explained in both the contracts and the annual municipal 
budget reports (MEF, 2009). Over the same period, the upper house of the parliament 
led a two-year investigation to determine important guidelines for local governments 
and their use of derivatives in the future (Italian Parliament, 2010a).  
Eventually, the short-lived government led by Enrico Letta made a complete 
volte-face in December 2013 and opted to transform the moratorium into a long-term 
solution. Thus, Italian local governments are now permanently prohibited from using 
derivatives, except in instances in which they intend to purchase interest rate caps on 
their actual loans (Cherubini, 2013; Italian Parliament, 2013). Municipalities now face 
the choice of either closing out their existing positions – most likely at a loss – or 
renegotiating them (Reuters, 2013). Alternatively, they can file lawsuits against 
financial intermediaries to attempt to invalidate their contracts. In this regard, media 
attention has focused on several trials such as the well-known case concerning the 
City of Milan against Deutsche Bank, JPMorgan, UBS and DePfa Bank (Martinuzzi, 
2013; Sirletti & Martinuzzi, 2014).  
It is worth noting similar experiences in other countries as Italian 
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municipalities were not the only parties that entered OTC derivatives markets. 
Certainly, they were notable for the extensive way in which derivatives were 
employed in public finance (Sanderson, et al., 2010) – a characterization that also 
applied to the central government and its adoption of derivatives-based techniques in 
the run-up to EMU entry during the 1990s (Dinmore, 2013a; 2013b; FT, 2013; 
Gabanelli, 2014; Penati, 2012; Piga, 2001; Steil, 2002). Yet, ever since swaps 
emerged in the United States during the early 1980s, episodes of derivatives debacles 
involving local authorities have been a recurrent phenomenon (Geisst, 2002; 
Markham, 2002; Swan, 1999). More important, most cases show that these practices 
vary on the basis of context-specific political struggles that unfold at different 
geographical scales.  
For instance, the infamous case of Orange County – which filed for 
bankruptcy protection in 1994 after losing approximately $1.7 billion in derivatives 
transactions – occurred in a context in which “politics in California had created a 
situation that made extraordinary returns for municipalities a godsend” (Geisst, 2002: 
320). This situation arose because – in a widespread popular spurning of high taxation 
(especially on property) – the state passed Proposition 13, which limited local 
authorities’ ability to raise taxes. Such limitations led to a shortfall in municipal 
revenues that needed to be compensated by some other means. In this context, the 
strategies developed by the Orange County Investment Pool and its treasurer Bob 
Citron were effective for a long period (Baldassare, 1998). 
More recently, French and German municipalities also engaged in complex 
derivatives transactions during the same years in which their Italian peers were 
enticed into financial innovation (Dodd, 2010). For example, the city of Saint Etienne 
in France was exposed to a negative market value on its derivatives position of 
 20 
approximately €100 million in 2010 (Katz, 2010). In Germany, the city of Pforzheim 
incurred losses on its derivatives transactions of approximately €57 million 
(Hendrikse & Sidaway, 2013). These instances of financial excess in present-day 
Europe highlight three aspects that – similar to the Italian case – played a central role 
in encouraging local governments to embrace derivatives. First, municipalities strove 
for revenues while facing unsustainable pressures stemming from a regime of fiscal 
consolidation. Second, the devolution of fiscal and administrative management to the 
sub-national level led to a lack of effective supervision over myriad fragmented local 
interests and their access to complex – often completely unknown – financial 
practices. Third, austerity and devolution encouraged municipalities to embrace 
market-based financing as a tactical response to the reduction in public expenditure. 
Although municipalities underestimated the risks of being exposed to financial 
volatility, these strategies represented a powerful political message in opposition to 
European-wide austerity programmes.  
 
Conclusions 
In one of his most famous and insightful passages, Foucault (1977: 176–7) described 
disciplinary power as follows:  
[It is] organized as a multiple, automatic and anonymous power; for 
although surveillance rests on individuals, its functioning is that of a 
network of relations from top to bottom, but also to a certain extent 
from bottom to top and laterally; this network ‘holds’ the whole 
together and traverses it in its entirety with effects of power that derive 
from one another: supervisors, perpetually supervised. The power in 
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the hierarchized surveillance of the disciplines is not possessed as a 
thing, or transferred as a property; it functions like a piece of 
machinery. And, although it is true that its pyramidal organization 
gives it a ‘head’, it is the apparatus as a whole that produces ‘power’ 
and distributes individuals in this permanent and continuous field. 
Foucauldian political economists adopt this definition of disciplinary power to explain 
how individuals perform financial affairs as a widespread and depoliticized apparatus 
of human discipline (Aitken, 2007; De Goede, 2005; Langley, 2009). Foucauldians 
emphasize the diffuse and performative character of financialized power rather than 
its ‘pyramidal organization’ – that is, the asymmetrical relations amongst the actors 
constituting it. However, this perspective fails to provide the appropriate analytical 
tools to capture the agency and political conflicts shaping financialized processes in 
their context-specific features. For this reason, Foucauldians cannot easily account for 
the varieties of financialization and the politics underlying such diversity (Engelen, et 
al., 2010; Engelen & Konings, 2010: 608–9; Montgomerie, 2008: 241; Nölke, et al., 
2013). 
This article has constructively engaged with Foucauldian studies on present-
day financial expansion. It has advanced the contention that the dimension of power 
should be operationalized at the level of historical agents and the institutions 
mediating agential relations. In this context, actors should be understood not as 
passive performers of financialization and its depoliticized market-based practices but 
as agents interacting with one another through the mediation of constantly 
renegotiated financialized institutions. In so doing, power becomes the agential ability 
to shape these mediating structures and leverage one’s own position vis-à-vis others 
(Knafo, 2010; Konings, 2010). This conceptual framework avoids the risk of reifying 
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power by being sensitive to the concrete politics producing financialization in distinct 
institutional contexts. 
Drawing on this agency-centred approach, the article has examined the case of 
Italian municipalities and their use of interest rate swaps during the 2000-2014 period. 
It has proceeded in three steps.  
First, the study has explored the agents, power struggles and processes of 
institutional construction that led to the introduction of financial derivatives in Italian 
local finance. It has shown that neoliberal reformists came to power in Italy during the 
1990s and challenged the traditional political-cum-business establishment by 
implementing fiscal austerity and liberalization measures under the auspices of the 
EMU and the Stability and Growth Pact. In addition to this, neoliberal reformists 
pushed for the devolution of fiscal and administrative authority. On the one hand, 
Italy’s adherence to the Stability and Growth Pact resulted in a reduction of fund 
transfers from the central state to the sub-sovereign level. On the other hand, 
devolution gave local authorities greater autonomy in the management of their 
finances and the possibility to use bonds and derivatives. These two trends created an 
institutional context in which local governments familiarized themselves with the 
methods and instruments of market-based finance. From 2001 onwards, the 
Berlusconi government enacted a regulatory framework to oversee the use of 
derivatives in local finance. This regulation contained loopholes that many local 
authorities exploited in unconventional ways. 
Second, the work has investigated the specific derivatives techniques that 
Italian municipalities employed. At first glance, the municipal adoption of interest 
rate swaps appears as a form of depoliticized performativity in which local 
administrators embraced the financialized discourse of derivatives-based risk 
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management. However, in contrast to such perspective, this article has argued that 
Italian municipalities used swaps as accounting artifices to circumvent the budget 
limits imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact. Far from performing and 
depoliticizing the use of swaps – as Foucauldian scholars would conclude – Italian 
local authorities wielded these instruments as part of a highly politicized strategy, the 
objective of which was to confront an unsustainable regime of fiscal austerity. While 
doing so, local governments enabled financial innovation to spread as a variegated 
and politically shaped phenomenon. 
Finally, the study has concluded with a review of the current developments in 
Italian local finance, particularly concerning the permanent ban on the use of 
derivatives by local authorities. The section has also referred to the derivatives 
excesses of other countries and how these were the result of context-specific political 
struggles against austerity programmes. 
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1 The financialization debate emerged more than a decade ago, providing an important intellectual 
terrain for critical scholars of diverse theoretical and disciplinary backgrounds. For a recent review, see 
Van der Zwan (2014). Financialization is commonly defined as “the increasing role of financial 
motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic 
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and international economies” (Epstein, 2005: 3).  
2 Derivatives are highly speculative contracts, the value of which derives from the price movements of 
other assets and variables. See Hull (2009: 1-16) for a brief introduction on derivatives markets, 
instruments and actors. Derivatives provide a fundamental function of risk management in the 
economy, and this innovative role stems from their ability to produce – at least theoretically – a 
complete market in the sense given by Arrow & Debreu (1954). According to this perspective, myriad 
derivatives would allow one to hedge the risks stemming from all future states of the world – for a 
critical examination of this thesis, see Wigan (2009) and Bryan & Rafferty (2006, 2011). However, as 
the 2007-2008 financial meltdown clearly demonstrated, the speculative nature of these instruments 
often overcomes their risk-management function, potentially leading to full-blown crises (Greenberger, 
2010). Derivatives most emblematically reflect the rise of finance (or financialization) in present-day 
capitalism. The global notional value of OTC derivatives markets was $691 trillion at the end of June 
2014 (BIS, 2014) – approximately ten times the gross world product (IMF, 2014: 184).  
3 OTC derivatives markets are vast and decentralized networks in which financial actors trade non-
standardized instruments without central counterparties intermediating between buyers and sellers. 
Compared with organized exchanges, trading on OTC markets implies a considerably higher exposure 
to risk (Hull, 2009: 1-3).  
4 Paulson was the United States Secretary of the Treasury and also a former chief executive officer of 
Goldman Sachs. Fuld was chief executive officer of Lehman Brothers. See Sorkin (2009). 
5 In Italy, local authorities refer to municipalities, provinces, metropolitan cities and regions (Italian 
Constitution, 1947). This study particularly focuses on municipalities. 
6 Neoliberalism denotes the ideology according to which “human well-being can best be advanced by 
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey, 2005: 2). The 
emphasis on the free market and the retreat of the state is a rhetorical matter. In reality, neoliberal 
forces capture state institutions and exploit them to secure their disciplinary role over society (Konings, 
2009a). 
7 Ironically, the very same Italian expression now refers to financial derivatives in their general features 
and use. 
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8 This regulatory framework can be summarized in the following six points: 1) Municipalities were 
allowed to use derivatives only for hedging purposes and on the basis of existing liabilities. 2) They 
were obliged to use currency swaps when issuing bonds in foreign currencies, as well as amortizing 
swaps when issuing bonds (or taking out loans) with single repayments at maturity. 3) Municipalities 
were allowed to use currency swaps, interest rate swaps, forward rate agreements, amortizing swaps 
and interest rate options (caps, collars). 4) They could have restructured their debt positions but could 
not have done so with the objective of postponing the maturity of the initial debt. Moreover, these 
operations could not have included an upfront sum above 1 per cent of the notional amount or an 
increasing flow of payments by the local authority to the counterparty over the duration of the contract. 
5) Local governments were obliged to enter into contracts with highly creditworthy dealers only and by 
using G7-area monetary parameters. Moreover, for contracts of approximately €100 million (notional 
value), they should have limited exposure to a single intermediary at 25 per cent of the total notional 
amount. 6) The Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) was responsible for monitoring derivatives 
activities every three months (Franco, 2009: 18–22, table 4). The Bank of Italy and the Italian securities 
market authority (CONSOB) were both responsible for controlling financial intermediaries and their 
derivatives operations with local authorities (Rosati, 2009: 9–11, 15–8). 
9 In the same period, the Berlusconi government launched the largest disinvestment of state-owned real 
estate in Europe through securitization. This opaque operation avoided the need to raise taxes or cut 
expenditures without breaching the deficit ceiling of 3 per cent (Corte dei Conti, 2006: 34; Munter, 
2004). Furthermore, the government implemented tax amnesties on repatriated offshore accounts and 
decriminalized corporate accounting fraud (Flores D’Arcais, 2011: 133; Ginsborg, 2003: 48). 
10 The following case is based on two interviews (September 04-05, 2012) with the head of financial 
services of the municipality in question. The interviewee kindly provided official documents after 
request to the mayor. 
11 Before the enactment of the European Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) in 2007, 
Italian local authorities had signed a controversial declaration in which they simply agreed to be 
considered operatori qualificati. See CONSOB (1998). 
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